The Counsel of the Fox. Examples of Counsel from the Commedia, Short Stories, Letters and Treatises

Abstract

If the aim of argumentation is that of increasing acceptance of the orator’s thesis (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 49), then the ultimate goal of counsel, a widespread argumentative practice within the genres of discourse as well as literature, is indeed persuasion. The subject of this essay—that is, the rhetoric of counsel—allows us to observe the interpretative richness of this element of the “new rhetoric” through examples offered by Dante, Giovanni Boccaccio, Lucrezia Borgia and Niccolò Machiavelli, straddling the late Middle Ages and the Renaissance, bridging the fields of literature and history.

Key words

counsel, persuasive practice, “new rhetoric”, Renaissance
rada, praktyki perswazyjne, „nowa retoryka”, renesans

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The Motives of Counsel

The word consiglio (counsel) in the Italian language still bears the influence of its Latin etymology, since within it remains the original meaning of “decision.” For example, this etymology is recognizable in the syntagma “prendere consiglio di” which means to set oneself to accomplish a specific action. The notion of counsel exists within the semantic field of exhortation, of warning, of peroration, and above all of persuasion; it cannot but have a persuasive purpose, whether declared or undeclared. Even today, in the Italian language, there exists a means, most certainly euphemistic, for defining a person’s negative behaviors without stigmatizing and causing further damage to that person. In this case, we limit ourselves to saying that she/he is malconsigliata (ill-counseled), thus attributing to others the responsibility of her/his ideas and actions. Many and diverse are the sources of this bad counsel: haste, momentary impulses, excessive ambition, false friendships and, in a theological sense, the devil himself. Thus, where counsel exists, there exist counselors as well, divided into good and bad, true and false friends. On the other hand, for counsel to be most effective, it must be dissimulated: that is, it must not be presented as such. In this way, counsel leads by example, in deeds rather than words, in silent action which inspires emulation in those who observe it, in words dripping with irony, in speaking as if in jest, and finally within the elegance of remaining quiet. Contrarily, other formulations can simulate the rhetoric of counsel. For example, one who threatens or blackmails another individual often simulates the rhetoric of counsel in his or her own nefarious action by concluding a criminally relevant act with the formula: “it’s for your own good.” Additionally, those who suggest behaviors not perfectly in line with the general ethical dimension quite frequently cloak them in the rhetoric of counsel: for example, the counsel of “turning a blind eye” to certain liberties, both large and
small, taken within the public and private spheres alike. There also exists a type of counsel expressed in the form of the *chleuasmus*, which borders on preterition. In this case, the counsel is simultaneously anticipated and negated by means of the formula: “who am I to give counsel?” (Capaci and Licheri 2014, 75-76).

Counsel is a part of every persuasive practice, from pedagogy to politics. Counsel usually contains a *pars destruens*, meant to discourage, and a *pars construens*, intended to point out what should be done. Counsel can be either good or bad, to be followed or ignored. It is on this basis as well that we distinguish between good and bad teachers; between those who lead us astray and those who help to shape us, leaving our freedom of choice intact or even enhanced. History teems with examples of good and bad counsel, in the form of model or anti-model. In the latter case, these negative examples often contain only empty assurances, built upon *actio*, *elocutio* and *pronuntiatio*. Rather than true advice, these are instead assurances that employ *pathos* more than *logos*. If the person who says “be serene” is not reliable and therefore feeble in ethical proof, then his unsubstantiated counsel raises immediate concern and consequent poor participation. Some examples of counsel use the *argumentum ad baculum* and appear more like threats. On the other hand, some threats cloak themselves in the euphemism of good counsel, paying homage to violence to hypocrisy. In this essay, for example, we will see how the fraudulent will can be legitimated in Machiavelli’s *Principe* through a new vision of the reasons of state, which conceals terrible and mysterious rules behind the apparent and benefic virtues of the man of government.

Counselors in the *Inferno*

Another negative example is that of fraudulent counsel, all the more serious when the person receiving this counsel has a special relationship with and is subject to the authority of the person offering it. In these cases, the counsel is tantamount to an abuse of power. Dante offers to the readers of Canto XXVII of his *Inferno* an example of this bad advice. Guido da Montefeltro tells how he was coerced by Boniface VIII to return to the role of evil political advisor by an assurance founded on the privilege of the Pope to pardon any sin. The Pope, however, overlooks the law of non-contradiction (Mortara Garavelli 2002, 215; Ellero 2017, 134) by which whoever truly wishes for the evil she claims to regret is indeed responsible for that evil. We have chosen to linger over Guido da Montefeltro because certain elements of the character’s personality (more fox than lion), notwithstanding the theological implications of the Dantine narrative, represent a literary foreshadowing of the counselor in Machiavelli’s *Principe*, but also because he is an example of one who, in spewing fraudulent and cynical counsel, is himself the victim of
evil counsel, precisely on the basis of the argument of authority. Dante presents Guido da Montefeltro as a man whose military service was inspired by the shrewdness of the fox and the courage of the lion: “‘Mentre ch’io forma fui d’ossa e di polpe / che la madre mi diè, l’opere mie / non furon leonine, ma di volpe. / Li accorgimenti e le coperte vie / io seppi tutte …’” (“While I still kept the form in flesh and bones / my mother gave me, my deeds were not / a lion’s but the actions of a fox. / Cunning stratagems and covert schemes, / I knew them all …”; Alighieri, Inf. XXVII, vv. 73-77). In other words, he comported himself as a political-military advisor whose principal weapon was the art of deception.

But let us try better to understand the situation. On the one hand we have Boniface VIII, the Pope whom Dante condemns to Inferno while he is still alive with the words of Nicholas III, who accuses the pontiff of having mutilated the beautiful woman (the Church) who was entrusted to him; on the other hand we have a military leader, disgusted with his own life and sincerely penitent, wishing to return to God. For this reason, when the sovereign pope (born Benedetto Caetani), persecutor of the Ghibellines and the Friars Minor, seeks counsel on his private war to which he gave the semblance of a crusade, Guido da Montefeltro responds to the Pope’s “drunkard” (mad) words with silence: “‘domandommi consiglio e io tacetti’” (“He asked me for counsel, and I kept silent”; Inf. XXVII, v. 98). Let us read this verse carefully, because within its rhythm there is a sense of stupor and disconcert. The conjunction e (and), prosodically absorbed by the rushing flow of the anapestic septenarius (the ictus falls on the third and sixth syllable) could serve an oppositional purpose by introducing Guido’s silence, locked within that “io tacetti” which reproduces a sense of embarrassment, disconcert, not to mention desperation (Fubini 1966, 10). The preoccupied silence of the warrior in Franciscan garb does nothing to halt the impetus of a sovereign-pontiff inclined to the abuse of power. It is no problem for Boniface VIII to reassure his accomplice by offering up, almost contra legem, the most costly word within his powerful grasp: that is, a pardon. The abuse of the question of authority is quite clear, as is the attempt at extortion, because in this moment Guido, a friar minor, is bound by his vow of obedience. In the mind of Pope Caetani exists only the Penestrine fortress, a metonym for his enemies; he sees nothing other than this symbol of rebellion which must be crushed. And so, in order to satisfy his thirst for victory in a minor war, the Pope does not hesitate to cloak his exhortation in arguments both serious and inadmissible. The Pope overcomes Guido’s resistance by reminding him of the power of absolution bestowed on the authority of the Gospel. And he reminds Guido of precisely that passage from the Gospels containing the allegory of the keys which the Lord gives to Peter; that is, those which open and close the gates to the kingdom of Heaven. The allegory is taken up once again in Canto XIII
of the *Inferno*, in which Pier della Vigna, another great but ill-fortuned counselor present in the *Inferno*, was making boasts about the very same trope of governing the heart and mind of Frederick II. This reference to the notary Pier della Vigna allows us a brief digression on his example as an allusion to the power of the counselor, to be understood not so much in terms of personal advantage but rather responsibility in exercising dominion over the mind of another. It suffices to think of the words with which the emperor’s unfortunate courtier evokes the effects of his power of counsel within the mind of his sovereign: “‘Io son colui che tenni ambo le chiavi / del core di Federigo, e che le volsi / serrando e diserrando, sì soavi / che dal segreto suo quasi ogn’uom tolsi’” (“I am the one who held both keys / to Frederick’s heart, and I could turn them, / locking and unlocking, so discreetly / I kept his secrets safe from almost everyone”; *Inf.* XIII, vv. 58-61)\(^1\).

**Irony in Counsel**

Counsel at times can be dissimulated, as, for instance, when a person gives counsel which demonstrates his or her need for counsel itself. This situation occurs in the ninth *novella* of the *Decameron*’s First Day, narrated by Elissa. During the third crusade, a woman from Gascony went on pilgrimage to the Holy Sepulchre, and on her way back was attacked by a gang of scoundrels. She refused to accept this injustice and decided to address her complaint to the king of Cyprus, the weak Giovanni da Lusingano. Everyone counselled her against this decision, knowing that this king was unwilling to punish injustice since he was unable to stand up to his own offenders, and therefore it would be useless to ask for his help. The king’s condition was so miserable that anyone with a gripe could lay the blame on him, as if he were a scapegoat. The woman, having lost any hope of obtaining justice, decided to use the opportunity to humiliate the king with her words. She did not reproach him openly but instead employed sarcasm through *argumentation by ridicule*. Derision is indeed a successful form of persuasion, as Perelman demonstrates (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, 148). When she stood before the king, the woman told him that she didn’t come asking for revenge, but rather to learn from him how to withstand the injuries she’d received. The king, struck by those words and thus awakened from his torpor, became a tough persecutor of those who offended the woman and of all those acting against the honour of his crown. Here is evident the use of the *argument ad hominem*, since this persuasive act was specifically suited to that particular case and interlocutor, thus forcing him to rise from his torpor an retake his role as sovereign. Rhetoric, therefore, is not only a way to obtain justice, but an action that incites the will to dialogue in which

\(^1\) The English translation of the *Inferno* is taken from Robert and Jean Hollander’s edition (Alighieri 2000).
dissimulation ("I’m not giving counsel but asking for counsel") adds energy to the persuasive act. Another element for reflection is the fact that in this case the woman strikes the first blow; she does not merely react to a strike against herself, as in Day Six of the Decameron and in many other novellas as well. This transgression of the rules is not only due to the violence suffered and the king’s inaction. The woman simply cannot tolerate the default of a sovereign whose duty it is to protect all within his realm, and for this reason she feels justified in ridiculing the king’s honour, describing his behaviour as *patiens* rather than *agens*, and making him look foolish. Upon closer look, the woman of Gascony is also making use of the argument of incompatibility: she ironically unveils the contradiction between the king’s actual behaviour and what should be his true role. This revelation takes place not through complaint, but by means of her clever use of ironic sarcasm, thus proving that ridicule has a specific and relevant function in argumentation as well as in the context of counsel.

**The Counsel of an Angel-like Fox**

In the summer of 1501 Lucrezia Borgia is about to get married once again. The sister of the notorious duke of Romagna and daughter of Pope Alexander I and Vanozza Cattanei is now undertaking her third wedding agreement with the mighty heir to the throne of Ferrara, Alfonso d’Este. The wedding negotiations are intense, because they concern the politics of the Italian states. The groom’s father asks the Pope for a substantial dowry, which also bears significance from a territorial and diplomatic point of view: the territories and castles of Cento and Pieve, and moreover the perpetual investiture of the Este’s dukedom; that is to say, the right to indefinite reign for themselves and their bloodline. After the troubled experience of her marriages with the count of Pesaro and the duke of Bisceglie, Lucrezia looks forward to the opportunity for marital happiness. The Pope and Cesare, her brother, wish to enhance their estates in Romagna, got by blood and conspiracies; to further their aim, they want Lucrezia to play a prominent role in the negotiations. Indeed, the Pope leaves Rome and entrusts to Lucrezia the custody of the Vatican palaces. This is a very careful strategy to promote the bride, making her the direct interlocutor of Ferrara. Moreover, Lucrezia is not a child-bride: she is twenty-one years old, mature for this time, considering, for instance, that Bianca Maria Visconti married Francesco Sforza when she was just seven years of age. The ASE, Este’s secret archive, contains—among others—two letters addressed to Ercole I and one to the powerful cardinal Ippolito d’Este which evidence the talents of the Pope’s daughter as a master negotiator. Here we are still within the rhetoric of the deliberative genre, although dissimulated in the private agreements of a wedding contract. The daughter of the Pope will be the new
duchess of Ferrara, and she must present a convincing image of the management of power; hence the Pope’s decision to leave her at the forefront. He wants the Estensi to understand that the bride is absolutely worthy of the role she is about to assume; and at the same time, he prefers not to expose himself directly within the negotiations, reserving for himself a margin of manoeuvre for any potential adjustment. On the other hand, Cesare Borgia knows that, with this marriage, his sister will bring to his dukedom the alliance of a mighty neighbour. This marriage would build a new political and diplomatic entity, starting from Rome and heading east until finally lapping at the feet of the republic of Venice. These are the preconditions with which Lucrezia must work. What strategy will she use in performing her role? Reassurance. What is the nature of her counsel? Making her interlocutors understand that the negotiation is in her hands. Why should this assure Ercole I? Because in this case, politics and marital happiness are concomitant. The future bride cannot afford a failure here, because she will never again have such a crucial opportunity to redeem her past. She is, as Francesco Guicciardini defines her, “spuria e coperta di molta infamia” (“spurious and laden with much infamy”), and she must make every effort to attain her goal (Guicciardini 2015, 516). Beyond her negotiating efforts, Lucrezia makes the ultimate sacrifice for a mother: she renounces her son Rodrigo di Bisceglie in order to come to her new groom totally free from her previous marriages. This enormous sacrifice will assure her future husband of her will to be, from that moment on, only Lucrezia Estense, and she represents herself in almost absolute persuasive terms, as historical documents and quotes from her own letters show. For instance, in a letter dated October XXI and addressed to Ercole I, she writes:

Avendo inteso per alcune lettere de vostra Signoria illustissima directine a questi soi oratori qui, e molta loro relatione, lo gran desiderio de quella circa l’estensione della investitura a li soi discendenti, como desiderosa et sua devota et obsequentissima figliola fargli in tutte cose a me possibile, como mio debito cosa grata, ne ho proximamente e con grandissima istantia supplicato alla Santità de nostro Signore2. Et benché la cosa sia alquanto grave, come intendo, pure sia certa vostra Eccellenza che, finante alla mia partita da qui, farò tal opera appresso sua Santità che conoscerà quanto sia grande il mio desiderio di servirla e compiacerla. (Lucrezia Estense de Borgia, 1501, October 21)

(Having understood, through several letters from your most illustrious Lordship addressed to your ambassadors here and on the basis of their many accounts, your great desire to extend the investiture to your descendants, as your devoted and most obsequious daughter, I am quite desirous to make it so by any means possible to me. And so to prove my gratefulness, I have immediately and with the greatest insistence supplicated to the Holiness of our Lord. And while the task is quite important, as I well understand, be assured, Your Excellence, that in the time before my departure from here, I shall set to work on his Holiness so that he will know just how great is my desire to serve and please you.)

2. Here Lucrezia refers to Pope Alexander VI.
Lucrezia understands the situation and is subtly ironic about their relationship, and particularly about the ambassador and the duke’s many requests to present their wishes to the Pope. There is no need to repeat these requests *ad nauseum*; Lucrezia knows what her new family wants. She spells it out, in order to avoid any misunderstanding: “l’investitura per li soi discenti”. She acts immediately: “ne ho proximamente e con grandissima istantia supplicato alla Santità de nostro Signore”. In other words, she has put strong pressure on the Pope. What is the counsel of this angel-like fox? To make no more requests. To avoid writing further letters. To avoid further attempts at pressuring. She, in fact, is the real political mediator, and not the ambassadors. Why should the duke trust her? Lucrezia is “sua devota et obsequentissima figliol è desiderosa a fargli in tutte cose a me possibile”. Though the task is really important—“Et benché la cosa sia alquanto grave”—it is not by any means superior to her qualities as a daughter and ambassador. At this step, Lucrezia’s speech is suspended between reticence and allusion, as she cannot presume the Pope’s approval, but she wants, nevertheless, to point out her persuasive talents, bolstered by the special bond between herself and the head of the Church: “pure sia certa vostra Eccellenza che, finante alla mia partita da qui, farò tal opera appresso sua Santità che conoscerà quanto sia grande il mio desiderio di servirla e compiacerla”. The letter is written in a marvellous rhetorical equilibrium. In my opinion, this is a true masterpiece of eloquence by a woman who, up to that moment, was the victim of her family’s political manoeuvring. We must keep in mind, as well, that this is the Italian Renaissance: levity and ploy intertwine in the persuasive words of an angel-like fox who can also deliver a bite when she mentions the long and boring speeches of the ambassadors. Her passion for brevity is one of the characteristics of her writing, as well as her complaints about the verbosity of the ambassadors, whom she often chooses to avoid, such as in the letter from September 28, where she prefers direct contact with the duke to their “cose prolixe che per meno non se porria” (“prolixity which could be shortened quite a bit”). The rhetoric of presence is very important to support the persuasive attempts of Lucrezia, who is leaving Rome to reach Ferrara. In this way, she anticipates her arrival, writing personally and establishing an emotional and persuasive connection. Nevertheless, the angel-like *golpe* has to consider another interlocutor, the powerful cardinal Ippolito d’Este, well known to the general public through Ariosto’s dedication in the *Orlando Furioso*. The cardinal is the *éminence grise* of the dukedom, linchpin of temporal and ecclesiastical power, the bishop of Modena and Milan, the *primates* of Hungary. A choleric and strong-tempered man; he did not hesitate to blind his half-brother during a dispute concerning certain ladies and musicians. Lucrezia therefore addresses a letter to Ippolito in order to assure him of the good outcome of the negotiations.
In this case, the Pope’s daughter chooses the path of *demonstration*: that is, to show to her brother-in-law just how much the Romagnol family like him. These are not mere pleasantries, but rather an illustration of the approval attained by the grand almoner: “Io illustissimo signor Duca di Romagna, mio fratello como deditissimo de quella sempre si trovarà pronto a tutti i beneplaciti e gratificazioni de vostra reverendissima Signoria” (“the most illustrious Duke of Romagna, my most dedicated brother, will always find himself ready with approvals and gratifications for your most reverent Lordship”). Lucrezia describes her brother Cesare while complying to all the requests in favour of the Cardinal, while in a previous quote of the same letter she informs Ippolito about the Pope’s gratitude for his *mandationi* (recommendations) which are always benevolently accepted. Lucrezia’s accreditation as a bridge to the Holy See is not limited to the wedding agreement, and it continues even after the Pope’s death, when the throne is held by the bellicose Giulio II. In a letter addressed to Alfonso I, Lucrezia clarifies how her diplomatic talent depends not only on her being the daughter of the Pope. In the summer of 1505, when the investiture of the sef of Pieve and Cento is uncertain, the *golpe* dictates a letter to her secretary for the *dominus consors*, where she acts as the bridge between the ambassador of France and her husband and subtly narrates the course of the Roman negotiations. Giulio II and the Cardinal of Bologna, after having threatened to deny investiture to the duke, now want to grant it only to his direct bloodline, having allowed this concession only because of the marriage between Lucrezia and Alfonso. Lucrezia counsels her husband to address Louis XII, king of France, since his ambassador is leading the negotiations in Rome. From a rhetorical point of view, the position of Giulio II consists of an enthymeme drawn from the tactic of argumentation by dissociation, which distinguishes between the universal and the particular investiture, between the general rule and the specific case: if this privilege is granted according to the wedding agreement, then it excludes the non-direct descendants. Lucrezia’s counsel is to have the king of France resolve the matter. She raises the stakes of the deal by means of an argument of authority which constitutes overcoming the Duke of Ferrara’s position of feudal inferiority. The king of France, who was the inspiration and guarantor of that union, is the very one to settle the matter. The decision of the Pope is unquestionable, but it is formally accepted and then delicately overturned by addressing it to the king. In this way, the vehemently Catholic king of France will be the advocate of the Duke of Ferrara, and the latter will escape a conflict he cannot afford as a feudal lord of the Pope, as it would cause him to fall victim quite easily to the argument of incompatibility. We have also demonstrated, in light of the most recent studies by Le Tuic (2014, 9-12) and Zarri (2007, 55), that the historical Lucrezia is quite different from her traditional portrayal as a femme fatale.
Counsels to the Prince

Had Machiavelli read Lucrezia’s letters, perhaps he could have added them to his “fresh example” contained in *Il Principe* and concerning the Borgia, who make their literary debut in 1513 in the pamphlet of the Florentine secretary. If ever there existed a work in Italian literature rich with political counsel, it is *Il Principe*, and this fact places it fully within the deliberative genre. In my opinion, this work is one of the Italian classics which lend themselves best to Chaim Perelman’s study of the new rhetoric (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969). The *incipit* of Chapter XVII discusses Cesare Borgia and his dilemma “An sit melius amari quam timeri vel o contra” (“whether it is better to be loved than feared”). Machiavelli illustrates the paradox that pity can be cruel and cruelty can be pitiful by two examples: the negative one of the Florentines who did not want to take action on Pistoia, leaving it to die under a blood feud, and the positive one of Cesare Borgia who united within a sole dukedom the whole of Romagna by the use of ferocity. Machiavelli’s counsel on the conceptual oxymoron is quite effective even within the current reality; that is, a reality corresponding with historical events in such a way that they are displayed in all their urgency and gravity. His pages establish the reason of State through the argument of comparison, which explains how cruel and pitiless behaviour by the prince, if enacted at the right moment and in favourable circumstances, may require a smaller sacrifice than would a more uncertain and apparently humanitarian attitude. Machiavelli introduces a further argument by dissociation between being feared and being hated: people are willing to accept violence, but not injustice, especially when perpetrated against their material possessions. The hated prince is feeble; the feared one is strong. The hated prince is subject to conspiracies and plots, and a new antagonist would immediately have popular support, or rather the excuse to act in revenge of the people’s suffering. The figure of Borgia also appears in the following chapter, *Quomodo fides a principibus sit serranda* (*Concerning the Way in Which Princes Should Keep Faith*), where Pope Alessandro VI is the protagonist of a “fresh”—that is, highly topical—example. In the rhetoric of *Il Principe*, the “fresh example” functions as a means to involve the contemporary reader, converting the essay into pamphlet, history into politics. *Logos* joins *pathos* in recent events. Here counsel takes its cue from a situation that is within the reader’s grasp, one whose consequences the reader currently is experiencing. Machiavelli utilizes the Pope Borgia’s *vituperatio* by turning it into a positive. He was a man of deception, unreliable when swearing that which he never in fact honoured; but he knew the mind of his enemies and therefore he could carry out his deceipts in the form of his political strategies. Machiavelli starts from the assumption that man in general is unreliable, and in this way he justifies the behaviour of the most unreliable among
the Italian sovereigns. With Alessandro VI, the zoomorphic allegory of the *golpe* appears to allude to the animal nature of power in its most fraudulent aspect. The metaphor of the fox thus brings us back to the beginning of the essay, to that idea of soft but stringent sagacity that in Pampinea’s talk suggested freedom from fear, while in Machiavelli it embodies the reason of state which supersedes the law, according to the *antithesis* at the basis of Machiavelli’s reasoning: we fight the law by applying to the *golpe* and the lion; that is, to the ferocity of political instinct. However, the *golpe* and lion do not stand in *antithesis*, but comprise the double nature of the prince. The *golpe* must be coloured with both simulation and dissimulation; the first reveals what one is not, the second hides one’s true nature. With Machiavelli, the fox enters the theatre of politics, bringing to the stage a power that many people can see, but few can touch to test its real consistency.

References


