Teaching eloquence in a transition period: Hispanic handbooks of rhetoric in the first half of the nineteenth century

Summary

During the first half of the nineteenth century, transformations in the mechanisms of political representation and the need to include new social sectors in the state apparatus led to the establishment of schools to increase the number of educated persons who would be capable of speaking in public and shaping the opinions of their fellow citizens. Teaching rhetoric gained new force in this setting. This article looks at a series of four secondary school handbooks of rhetoric published in Spanish, from the perspective of glottopolitics. The study focuses on the sections in these books about eloquence and looks at (a) how they deal with speaking, the models they provide, the contrasts they establish between ancient and modern, and the genres they deal with, and (b) how they prescribe rules, and observations on the speaker’s education regarding morality and knowledge needed to perform efficiently. The analysis shows that these aspects changed over time and how this relates to the social changes occurring at the time.

Key words

Handbooks of Rhetoric, eloquence, glottopolitics, Vicente Fidel López, José Gómez Hermosilla, José Luis Munárriz, Antonio Gil de Zárate

License

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Poland. The content of the license is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/pl/
Teaching eloquence in a transition period: Hispanic handbooks of rhetoric in the first half of the nineteenth century

It has been noted that linguistic historiography has reflected less on rhetoric than on grammars, orthographies and dictionaries, and it has even been claimed that rhetoric has little visibility (Laborda Gil, 2005). Rhetoric forms reflections on discourse which contain a strong prescriptive component. In order for rhetoric to find a place in the field of linguistic historiography, we have had to wait for historiography to look at various language sciences, and to take an interest in the history of ideas in the wider sense (following Sylvain Auroux, 1989, 1992, 2000), including the regulation of speeches (Douay-Soublin, 1992). Reflection on rhetoric has been enriched by studies from other theoretical domains which have looked into the history of rhetoric at its various stages, from Greco-Latin antiquity to the present day (Paraíso Almanza, 2000). There are currently research programs focusing on different issues, among which the teaching of rhetoric has a significant place.

Our enquiry is made from the standpoint of Glottopolitics. This means that we consider rhetoric as intervention in the public domain of language associated with certain linguistic ideologies, to shape beliefs as required by the social processes in which they exist. This approach needs to consider the various lengths of time over which certain practices and ideas lasted. Some ideas lasted for long periods of time (e.g. the idea that a good speaker should be a good person, as claimed in the rhetoric we studied, and following a tradition that began in antiquity). Other ideas arose in connection with social and cultural changes specific to a medium length of time (e.g. in the stage we are studying, the idea that rhetoric is insufficient unless accompanied by the mastery of new knowledge).

This paper enquires into a series of handbooks of rhetoric published in the first half of the nineteenth century¹ which were used in the Hispanic world and had an influence on how people were educated. The national states needed these educated

---

¹ On nineteenth century rhetoric, see Fernández López, 2008; García Tejera, 1990, 1993; and Hernández Guerrero, 1990.
people to set up not only the bureaucratic apparatus and the various institutions of civil society (the press, among others) but also the new forms of citizen participation in the representative system. We believe that this explains the so-called “renaissance” of rhetoric, which had been questioned by ideologists of the illustrated philosophical avant-garde and by Romantic sensitivity expressed in the field of literature. The former had excluded Rhetoric from the programs at the French Central Schools because they prioritized the precision of reasoning, not the ornatus. The Romantics, though not insensitive to rhetoric reflection on figures, exalted the writer’s freedom, not rules (Arnoux, 2013).

The starting point for our series on rhetoric is a handbook written from a geographically peripheral location (Santiago de Chile), Curso de Bellas Letras (Course on Belles-Lettres) (1845) by Argentinean writer Vicente Fidel López, for the educational system of one of the first Hispanic American national States to be established in the nineteenth century. The book by López is the most recent in our series, and the other three are the Hispanic texts to which it refers either because it shares sources with them or because it disagrees with them. They are: Compendio de las Lecciones sobre la Retórica y Bellas Letras de Hugo Blair (Compendium of Hugh Blair’s Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres) (1815) by José Luis Munárriz; Arte de hablar en prosa y verso (Art of Speaking in Prose and Verse) (1826) by José Gómez Hermosilla; and Manual de Literatura. Principios generales de Poética y Retórica (Handbook of Literature. General Principles of Poetic and Rhetoric) (1842) by Antonio Gil de Zárate. Blair’s treatise, Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles-Lettres (1783), was adapted by Munárriz in his well-known Compendium, which is why we refer to Munárriz, who wrote the pedagogical reformulation, as the author. In the “Warning,” he notes that he also took into account an abridged version in English of Blair’s “Essays on Rhetoric,” although he describes it as an “arid compendium, a skeleton” (III), which compels him to write another one. López and Hermosilla also cite Blair’s writings in several parts of their texts. Hermosilla adapted Blair’s writings as he saw fit, and noted these adaptations. In short, all four handbooks refer to Blair, as was perhaps inevitable at the time (Soria Olmedo, 1979).

We will begin by presenting López’ views on the other texts, reflecting both the advance of Romantic sensitivity and concern regarding the systematization of knowledge. Then, we will focus on the treatment of eloquence in the handbooks, considering (a) the definitions of eloquence, the relationship with the Latin tradition and European literatures, the difference they propose between ancient and modern, the tension between orality and literacy and the genres they relate to; and (b) how they propose to educate the orator, for which we shall look at (i) how they
deal with rules and (ii) their views on civic virtue and the wide range of knowledge that aspiring orators should acquire.

The handbooks of rhetoric

Rhetoric underwent extensive evolution up to the nineteenth century. An examination of rhetoric from different ages shows that the most enduring rhetoric types are those associated to eloquence (deliberative, demonstrative and judicial), aspects that should be considered for preparing and producing speeches (invention, disposition, elocution, memory and action) and the components proposed for each (exordium, proposition, narration, confirmation, refutation, peroration). Their historical relationship with other fields, primarily the arts of preaching, epistolary and poetics, has also been long-lasting.

Their aim is pedagogical, and they show that the same kinds of strategies (particularly those based on writing) have been used over time for training orators to speak. Erasmus (following Quintilian) defined these strategies as variation and amplification. They have appeared in numerous exercises throughout the centuries, in one or more languages, their primary operation traditionally having been reformulation (Desbordes, 1996).

We should also consider the way in which these pedagogical strategies were applied at different times in history at schools that taught rhetoric (originally in Latin and later in vernacular European languages), used prestigious models and proposed evaluations, where for example the use of controversy developed the ability to argue, establishing a strong discursive setting at schools.

We are interested in enquiring into how handbooks from the first half of the nineteenth century deal with eloquence, which can be considered the core of rhetoric. Eloquence underwent a revival as from the late eighteenth century because certain deliberative genres increased in importance in connection with revolutionary processes. This reflects the need to shape national communities based on legitimate models of public speaking (particularly in European vernacular languages) and to expand the state apparatus by educating people so that they would be able to act in different capacities. Eloquence disappeared from secondary school teaching in the latter third of the nineteenth century. As the importance of history and literature increased, eloquence was replaced by school discursive genres and text commentaries in the subjects Language and Literature (Arnoux and Blanco, 2004; Compagnon, 1999; Douay-Soublin, 1992; Genette, 1976; Pedrazuela Fuentes, 2011) and written reflections (in the form of dissertations in
some academic traditions) in other subjects such as Philosophy and History. In the late nineteenth century, the increasing number of students enrolling at secondary schools ultimately led to the ruling class learning formal oral discourse skills at other venues for social interaction or other educational levels, such as university.

Handbooks of rhetoric for schools in the first half of the nineteenth century reflect the advance of literary genres (Morales Sánchez, 2000), and include the epistolary genre and genres related to Christian preaching. They also show certain interest in historical genres as a means for constructing social memory, and include a section on eloquence, which had to be mastered by the members of the new state apparatus. New political practices led to appreciation of this type of oratory, although some authors supported it for its discursive potential:

This genre [public speaking] admits the most movement, most heat, most daring ideas, most fantasy in images, the greatest display of language. Better than any other, it can address the passions, and it is this resource which most often garners the greatest triumphs (Gil de Zárate, 1904).

The focus of the treatises shifts over time from speaking to writing. They provide plentiful advice for writing, and a transition can be seen from preoccupation with writing to interest in literature and the intention of broadening it to include genres of non-literary writing due to the association between eloquence and persuasive prose. The treatises can be said to be included in two trends with roots in the eighteenth century: the development of the arts of writing and the increasing importance of literature. The arts of writing tend to reflect on the specificity of writing and to educate people who will write texts of informative prose, didactics or politics, following the expansion of written culture and the reading audience (Arnoux, 2008). Literature became important to the extent in which it helped shape the national ideas necessary for consolidation of the States, by providing reading material which could be shared by increasingly broader sectors of the population.

The handbooks we are considering belong to a transition stage, as reflected by their titles. Although these titles show that they belong to the rhetorical tradition, they refer to literature either directly or metonymically (e.g. prose and verse). Indeed, those titles and the relative importance of each text are influenced by the social standing of the authors and the provisions of the national educational

---

2. This development, which is owed particularly to transformations in the way discourse was taught at nineteenth century schools (Arnoux, 2013) is included in what Schaeffer (1885) recognizes as the interaction between rhetoric and poetics, which begins in ancient Latin and reaches the nineteenth century.

3. Murphy (1986) refers extensively to the Medieval origin of ars dictaminis como del ars praedicandi. For later developments, see Bouvet (2006); Fumaroli (1980); and Régent-Susini (2009).

4. Citations of sources provide only page number between brackets.

5. For the historical reasons of this transition, see Chartier (1995); Habermas (1986); and Petrucci (2003).
systems which were established in the first half of the nineteenth century\textsuperscript{6}, when secondary education was progressing slowly\textsuperscript{7}. Although these handbooks do not provide classroom exercises, their pedagogical orientation is reflected by their sets of rules and specifications regarding the education of the speaker. The examples provided in them range from simply naming suggested authors, to examples so long that they foreshadow the compilations or anthologies of models that would later be used for teaching rhetoric at schools.

**Sources and points of controversy in López**

López writes his text on rhetoric from a critical position. Among other things, he focuses on the relative usefulness of rules, the need to develop rhetoric based on current texts, the importance of placing the development of genres in historical context and the influence of reading good writers on producing well organized, well grounded, aesthetically valid texts (Arnoux, 2008). His main source is the work of Hugh Blair, which was already in use in philosophy courses at schools in Buenos Aires when López was a student. These philosophy courses were based on the perspective of the ideologists, yet at the same time contested them by teaching rhetoric, which the ideologists, in particular Destutt de Tracy, had rejected. Professors Juan Crisóstomo Lafinur, Fernández de Agüero and Diego Alcorta referred their students to Blair’s text.

Even though López recognizes that Blair is the author who “enjoys the most solid and widest authority on the subject” and says “it is not possible to specify the nature of the subordinate parts of style or to determine figures more precisely than he has done,” with regard to general laws, he objects to Blair’s lack of historical perspective, saying:

> Regarding those that depend on the prevalent trends, on the great turns taken by human thought through the various ages of its development, Blair is incomplete and almost always null. This part of his book has remained in the age for which it was written, whereas human intelligence, and literature with it, have taken enormous steps forward and discovered new domains (III).

\textsuperscript{6} In Spain, González Alcazar (2006) says that when Hermosilla’s text appeared, it was declared the only text for the departments of Humanities, substituting Blair, and this held true until 1835. On the other hand, the importance acquired by Gil de Zárate’s work was influenced by the weight of his participation in the preparation of the 1845 plan regulating secondary school teaching and his position as General Director General of Public Instruction (1846-1850). Vicente Fidel López belonged to the group of Argentine émigrés who took active part in starting up educational institutions of the national Chilean State, and was professor of the department of Rhetoric at the National Institute, which became the pattern on which the secondary teaching system was based.

\textsuperscript{7} For Spain, Puelles Benítez (1998) suggests that the policy of systematically creating secondary schools begins in 1839, but it becomes emancipated from university teaching and constituted as a separate level in the educational system in 1847. For Chile, see Arnoux (2008: 368).
Thus he proposes:

[…] both in general speculations that I use as a basis, and in the order of exposition, I have separated myself completely from Blair, not because of any vain pretension to be original, but because otherwise it would have been impossible for me to develop my ideas and produce the work as I conceived it. But in the details, the minutiae, I have completely followed the English author. (IV)

López also mentions two important Spanish handbooks which we have included in the series: Gómez de Hermosilla and Gil de Zárate. Although he includes them in his reading materials, his attitude is critical, particularly of Gómez de Hermosilla. His opinions in the mid-nineteenth century on these authors, who were widely read in the Hispanic world and linked in Spain to educational projects and political circumstances, provide us with a glimpse of the transition from the “renaissance” of rhetoric to its progressive disappearance as a school subject in the latter decades of that century. He refers to the work of Hermosilla as follows:

[…] an enemy of anything new and revolutionary, stubborn and petulant, outspoken and retrograde like no other; daring and completely ignorant of the theories that this century’s philosophy has used as a basis for literary studies […] without having produced, I say, a single bright idea, a single novelty, or having given the subject he was working on any of the advantages of a new exposition or a more appropriate study method. (II)

López’s irritation reflects wider debates: in the field of culture, between Neoclassics like Hermosilla (González Ollé, 1995; Sardón Navarro, 2000) and Romantics, and in the field of education with regard to what knowledge and methods should be used at schools.

About Gil de Zárate, López says: “he does not deserve reproaches such as I have made against Hermosilla,” perhaps because he agrees with Gil de Zárate’s belief in the relative value of rules: “we are born eloquent as we are born poets; and art alone makes us neither eloquent nor poets” (161). Nevertheless, he says that Gil de Zárate’s text “cannot be used for teaching youth” on the grounds that it lacks method:

The whole set of ideas he embraces rests on entirely arbitrary division; moreover, it lacks method, logic, connection, and precision, and is written so languidly and weakly, so lacking in general ideas and solid, well grounded principles, that it is more like a collection of notes than a system of parts which are linked and dependent upon each other…

The criticism reflects López’s preoccupation with systematizing knowledge of rhetoric (influenced by his training with Río de la Plata ideologists) by establishing clear categories and oppositions to separate the different genres, and leading students along a path progressing from the known to the new, from the synthetic
to the analytical. He also questions Gil de Zárate’s originality regarding literary knowledge:

The most interesting parts of this book are servile copies of French and German authors. In its treatment of dramatic poetry, it contains nothing that has not been copied from Schlegel’s course on dramatic poetry and Villemain’s course; and almost the same can be said of its notes on epic poetry, of which extensive sections belong to various foreign writers. (II)

Making use of other texts in this way is a feature typical of all four handbooks, including the one by López, because they are based on various sources which are adapted to the new purpose, with or without citation.

I will analyze in these handbooks the section on eloquence, which is included in the extensive tradition of rhetoric. As mentioned, the handbooks included eloquence because the new societies needed to educate people from non-traditional sectors so that they would be able take part in establishing representative institutions. The inconsistencies between books and the changes in the way topics are dealt with provide a glimpse of the transitions of the times.

**On eloquence**

*Definitions and new scope*

The definitions of eloquence show concurrence and tension between two features: being proffered orally in significant social situations and being based on a chain of argument destined to persuade—the art of persuading through words—which was the main aim of rhetoric: “the power of the word to convince and to move, put into action by any person” (López, 155). Focusing on effects—persuasion—enables eloquence to be opened up to “all kinds of writings,” as in Gil de Zárate, to the extent in which they “influence behavior or persuade to act” (160), and to various oral genres, as in López, who considers lessons taught at schools of higher education and speeches at clubs, meetings, loggias and literary associations. These authors are thus sensitive to the expansion of written culture and to new social settings.

Munárriz, too, defines eloquence as “the art of speaking so that the purpose of speaking is achieved,” i.e. “the art of persuasion” (180), a conception that enables the broadening of the usual themes and genres of the art of oratory: “In order to persuade, the most essential requisites are solid proof, clear method and the orator having a character of recognized probity; together with grace of style and expression, which draw our attention to what is being said” (181).

Hermosilla, the most traditional, focuses on what he calls “oratory compositions,” noting that “they include any reasoning spoken out loud in front of a more
or less numerous audience, generally called orations, harangues or speeches” (290).

Although Gil de Zárate repeats this definition, he also takes up the subject of the “art of persuasion,” extending eloquence to written genres. This broadening of the field of eloquence is partly explained by the development of journalism (which shapes public opinion) (Fernández Rodríguez, 2012) and of the pamphlet (which motivates), as well as by the beliefs that writing is an important tool for exercising political discipline at a time when representative systems are developing, and that deferred communication through writing allows people to reflect, and, as a result, calms passions.

Michel Delon (1999:1012) claims that just as the eloquence of the spoken word and the presence of the speaker corresponded to direct democracy, the eloquence of the written word and mediation through printed texts correspond to parliamentary democracy. Moreover, in addition to being used in politics, the art of persuasion is used in Romantic writing of History. The most renowned Romantic historians “know that History is the genre that is closest to eloquence, both because it draws its grandness and elevation from the great themes it discusses, and because its mission is to derive general ideas from its narration” (Michel, 1999: 1052).

Models: languages and literary traditions

The importance of the Latin tradition is clear in the categories, genres, themes, authorities cited and models provided in these handbooks. Although they are all written in European vernacular language, a comparison shows a transition from the earliest text, which is amply illustrated with fragments of Latin (the remains of the old rhetoric teaching associated to Latin lessons, taken up again at the time we are looking at), to later texts, which provide quotes in Spanish, either original or translated from other languages.

It should be noted that the transition from Latin to Spanish for teaching rhetoric was legally authorized in the educational system in the second half of the eighteenth century, with King Charles III’s charter of June 23, 1768, which established that rhetoric should be taught in Spanish at pre-university courses and recommended the use of Spanish in higher education. The charter considers the possibility that the change to Spanish may have already been implemented in pre-university courses, specifying “wherever it is not practiced,” and allowing for the existence of different modalities in lessons, handbooks, examples and exercises. Moreover, the decision to use Spanish is based on the need to “extend the general language of the Nation for its greater harmony and reciprocal ties”

8. My translation of this and other quotes.
(Charles III, [1768]: 4), based upon one of the pillars of national association: a common language, which is also constructed through shared readings. However, the use of vernacular languages for teaching rhetoric did not spread uniformly. In Río de la Plata, for example, in the revolutionary 1810 decade, Laininur was the first to teach rhetoric in Spanish (Arnoux, 2010). At the time we are analyzing, the treatises on rhetoric were written in Spanish, and rhetoric as a subject was taught in Spanish, but the examples in the handbooks are mixed, and include excerpts in Latin with or without translation, excerpts which are directly translated, excerpts in Spanish by Spanish authors and excerpts in Spanish translated from other languages, in particular French.

Munárriz’s Compendium, published in 1815, contains many Latin excerpts as authoritative quotes. This differs from what he did in the Spanish version of Blair’s text, where he also provided translations of the excerpts. He justifies this as follows:

As this compendium will be used by students who have just taken Latin courses and will be perfectly able to manage the language, I have included the texts in Latin without Spanish translation. This fulfills two aims: the length of the compendium will not be increased, and making the students read Latin will prevent them from forgetting that wise tongue and fix in their memory beautiful examples and fine precepts of the classics of ancient Rome. (V)

Most examples are from Horatio, Cicerio, Quintilian ("the most instructive and useful," 266), but others are from some European authors such as La Bruyere and Fenelon, translated into Spanish. Munárriz also appreciates French preachers Bourdaloue and Massillon, saying: “Spain has no preachers that compare to these two,” although he does make some general references to Juan de Ávila and Fray Luis de Granada. In this regard he says, “Whosoever would train to speak in public should study Cervantes, and even more so the V. Granada, though without losing sight of their defects” (266).

Hermosilla stresses classical models for the forum and deliberative settings: “Those who wish to be outstanding in the forum should read and unread very carefully the forensic orations of Demosthenes and Cicerio” (310), even though he points out, as we shall see, differences with the practices of the ancient world. When he uses Latin texts he adds the translation, but in some cases they are only mentioned, and excerpts are not included in his book. Cicero is the primary model for oratory: “Cicerio will give us examples of all these” (207); “Cicerio stands out for his admirable talent in narration, and all his harangues can serve as models; but among them, read with particular care the orations in Pro Roscio Amerino…” (206). He sometimes comments and summarizes extensive Latin texts. Other times, the references to eloquence are mainly European, not Castilian.
The best examples of forensic eloquence that have been published in Spanish are the fiscal accusations of D. Juan Melendez Valdés. Neither these nor any other authors will be quoted herein, but rather, the quotes will be published in the second part, in which we shall speak of each of them individually, criticize their works, and provide examples of their styles (186).

López provides plentiful references of French eloquence to support or supplement his statements: Bossuet, Masillon, Berville, Maury, Cormenin and Delamalle. This reflects his appreciation of the French culture and disdain for the culture of Spain, as was usual among émigrés from Río de la Plata. Sometimes he names and praises the authors, and other times he provides excerpts translated into Spanish.

The authorities and models cited in the handbooks show the transition from the Latin culture to the culture of some of the European languages, and the influence of the French culture. The authors we are analyzing needed to use models from their own cultures in order to nationalize teaching, but this was easier for the Spaniard (Gil de Zárate) than for the Hispanic American (López) because the former could use literature published prior to the Independence process without incurring in inconsistency.

**The ancient and the modern**

All the handbooks we have analyzed in some way consider and reflect on the history of public speaking practices: “with different civilizations, the object and even the essence of oratory have changed” (Munárriz, 162). The historical context for the contrast between modern and ancient eloquence enables the authors to point out the features of eloquence in their own times. Munárriz considers that modern man is “more artistic and correct but less energetic” (269); however he believes that although ancient models should be imitated, it is necessary to “be mindful of current taste and manners” (205). In this regard, he follows rhetorical tradition, which takes into account the occasion on which the speech is made, the audience, the characteristics of the orator, the features of the institutional setting, and the times. Thus, with regard to appropriateness, he says: “the eloquence of the forum is, due to its genre, much more temperate or modest, than that of popular meetings; and even the judicial sentences of Cicero and Demosthenes cannot be considered as oratorical models in the present state of our courts” (215).

The other handbooks emphasize the influence of the new situations in which public speaking takes place. Hermosilla notes differences based on the practices and social settings in which the speech is pronounced. With regard to political oratory, he says:

The ancients spoke to a mixed audience composed mainly of coarse and ignorant populace, so they had to speak more to the passions than to the reason of their listeners, adapting to their
coarseness and providing proof rather neatly. Modern orators speak to a select audience made up of persons who we must assume are highly educated and intelligent, for whom slight indications usually suffice. It is not as necessary to move their hearts strongly as it is to illustrate and persuade (312).

Gil de Zárate (who had an important political career, Morales Sánchez, 2000) also mentions that the populace is less important as an audience for political speeches in representative democracy (in contrast to direct democracy):

It is true that the people are allowed into our political assemblies; but even in the largest of rooms, only a small number attend as mere spectators, and they are barred from making any kind of demonstration; whereas in the ancient republics, the people formed the assembly itself, they were an active party, they became agitated, demonstrating through their acclamation the effect of the speeches, in a word, they discussed and voted (192).

He goes on to say that the ancients even resorted to dramatic resources to persuade and that they endeavored to move the audience rather than to persuade “with the arms of reason” (163). He claims that “the arms of reason” are essential at the current time because of the “forms of representative government in many countries of Europe” (167). He says that current orators speak to “an assembly of chosen men enclosed in a small room where there is no need to strain the voice” (194). Although he admits that “the impetuous harangues of some orators keep them [the people] in mind rather than their true audience” he criticizes them as: “reprehensible excesses that should be restrained” (192). Regarding forensic eloquence, he says that the ancient models are largely inapplicable to modern oratory:

It would be ridiculous nowadays to imitate Demosthenes and Cicero in their exaggerations and aggrandizement, in their diffuse and vehement declamation, in their efforts to excite passions, and even more so in the insults and affronts they allowed themselves to utter against their adversaries (184).

López also puts rhetoric in historical context and considers two kinds of situations in which the modern orator may find himself: situations resulting from “that peaceful and normal state in which public issues are discussed according to set rules,” typical of parliamentary life, and revolutionary situations, which are expressed at “clubs, meetings and loggias.” With regard to situations typical of parliamentary life:

Eloquence cannot in our days be the voice of vulgar passions, but must be the voice of philosophical progress of civilization and industrial progress that science and business liberaly provide to the people. Political eloquence nowadays should not agitate, it should be dogmatic; it should teach, not alarm, it should rule in the name of reason and progress. [...] The orator nowadays is therefore not, like the orator of yesterday, the voice of passions of multitudes, but rather the representative of their interests (166).
With regard to revolutionary situations, “as Cormemin says,” “the orator’s discourse is necessarily haughty, his expression swells and becomes grand; he encourages, he becomes enraged, and by means of the passionate disorder of sentiments and ideas, he achieves the most persuasive and powerful eloquence” (169).

In order for the handbooks to fulfill the social purpose they were written for — educating the ruling class — they needed to recognize modern modes of eloquence, even when they were based on ancient sources. It is also interesting to note that they claim that eloquence should refer to national features in order to help construct the ideas of the nation State:

As inhabitants of a southern country, a hot climate, who have more imagination and Oriental influence in our customs and literature, we cannot and should not always be subjected to the prosaic character of some northern countries. We will never cease to be sensitive to the power of images and the charms of language (Gil de Zárate, 194).

The contrast between ancient and modern is thus used to describe/prescribe what sort of eloquence is appropriate to different situations and settings. At the same time, it shows features of political life and other cultural practices where the art of persuasion is important.

**Relationship between speaking and writing**

With regard to spoken discourse, the treatises we are looking at deal with topics ranging from being mindful of actio, which in political discursiveness often defines the situation being dealt with and its various components, to the advantages of giving the impression of improvisation, particularly in political oratory (and in López, also in didactic oratory). Paradoxically, improvisation is subject to many rules, which state that in socially legitimate and valued situations, speech flows naturally if it has been prepared beforehand and is supported by a text or written outline. With regard to actio, Munárriz, based on the example of Demosthenes, says: “Do not believe that managing voice and gestures belongs only to ornatus. It is closely tied to persuasion, which is the purpose of all public elocution” (247). He provides rules for tone of voice, gaze and gestures, and analyzes emphasis and pauses:

To perform properly, be mindful of how tones, gestures and looks best express compassion, indignation and other feelings, so that the speaker abides by them. […] The public speaker may maintain dignity in his entire bodily attitude, usually choosing erect posture, leaning slightly forward, as if expressing natural interest. His facial expression should match the nature of the speech, and when not expressing any particular emotion, the best is a serious and grave gaze. His eyes should never be fixed upon a single object. It is natural to employ the right hand more frequently then the left, but ardent emotions require the use of both hands… (256).
He also advises the readers that the speech should be prepared from written text: “the right emphasis should be sought before pronouncing it in public, by underlining emphatic words, at least in the most expressive parts, in order to memorize them properly” (251).

López is briefer, possibly because the “naturalness” of Romanticism disdains any excessive control of emotions and the set of rules for posture and gesture. However, he does mention the need to adapt to the audience:

The ultimate effect of the speech itself depends on enunciation, declamation, and in part, on mimicry: in this regard the speaker should be careful to be sincere and unaffected, to let his soul shine through, and to ensure that all possible analogies in his action are in keeping with the character and tastes of his audience (182).

Gil de Zárate stresses the importance of a “pure and sonorous” voice: “The voice has so much power in eloquence and declamation, that without it, the most beautiful features of ingenuity and study are lost; with it, in contrast, even the weakest things acquire matchless value” (181). Regarding improvisation, he contends that “a speech that is improvised will always make a better impression on the audience than one that is read, even if its merits are fewer.” Regarding public speaking (he does not deal with other aspects of actio) he advises the speaker to prepare beforehand in order to enable “the improvisation” to be adequate and fluent:

He should study the subject in depth, become familiar with it and take ownership of it; he should make quite extensive and organized notes, so that he can find things in them easily when necessary; if possible, arrange in his mind the order of his speech and have prepared the principal arguments. It is not a bad idea to compose some parts and learn them by heart in order to utter them at the right opportunity; but neither the order nor the parts should be so invariable as to prevent the speaker from modifying them as required according to the order of the discussion (198).

This excerpt shows the remains of a topic which had by then been abandoned in rhetoric taught at schools: memorization. Note that since Condillac, memorizing had been criticized in educational settings, and prevalence assigned to reasoning. In the excerpt from Gil de Zárate, memorization supports the effect of improvising. López also refers to improvisation, but omits its “preparation,” which was supported in various texts in the tradition of rhetoric dealt with by other authors:

[…] the main character, and the main strength of parliamentary eloquence is improvisation, because improvisation, as Cormenin says, is always in the real situation. When a speaker improvises, he necessarily puts forth his ideas applied to the needs of the moment, mixed with the impressions that things, persons, places, ideas and feelings dominating in the audience make on his soul. […] Thus, it is entirely impossible to establish fixed rules to teach the political orator how to be eloquent; and all that can be aspired to is to characterize a social event such as this, so complete, so combined with another multitude of exercises and accidents that are impossible to foresee. (162).
Thus, the handbooks we are looking at still preserve some references to *actio* and value improvisation. Most of the authors believe that improvisation is achieved through previous preparation and at the same time being mindful of the demands of the situation. López, who is more of a Romantic, prefers to think that there are no rules to “support” improvisation.

**Genres mentioned in the treatises**

An analysis of genre in the treatises shows the transition from greater attachment to classical classifications to the introduction of new genres, which may imply the extension of eloquence to writing or other social practices which consolidate the link between rhetoric and politics.

Although Munárriz recognizes the three-way classification into demonstrative, deliberative and judicial, he proposes to modernize it considering “the three scenes of modern eloquence”: popular meetings, forum and pulpit (206).

The more traditional Hermosilla adds to deliberative, judicial and sacred eloquence the demonstrative genres of classic rhetoric, proposing a long list: eulogy, panegyric, invective, vituperative, funeral oration, genethliac, epithalamium, eucharistic, consolatory.

Gil de Zárate, in the context of political oratory (the other two he indicates as current at his time are sacred and forensic), notes other possible genres related to new situations, in addition to parliamentary, which require particular styles:

The speaker may be a member of a *private council* which holds sessions behind closed doors, a *senate*, or a *popular chamber*; and each of those bodies equally requires a different tone. [...] Nowadays the spirit of association has become widespread and *corporations* are formed everywhere, even for purely literary and artistic objects. These meetings are always friendly; therefore, conferences in them should be very close to mere conversations, during which dissertation, not discussion is used. [...] Moreover, the *speaker’s* language should omit any vain pomp, and seek to be clear, methodical and precise, rather than elevated and pathetic, and to be content with amiable elegance, its main merit based on healthy, well presented doctrine. (195)

López considers speeches pronounced “at meetings held from time to time, called clubs, meetings, loggias, etc.” (169) and demonstrative speeches: panegyric, eulogy and funeral oration. He dwells upon the *lesson* at schools of higher education, which is the genre of “dogmatic eloquence,” a type of discourse he adds to the sacred, the political and the forum. He defines *lesson* as:

…the genre of eloquence in a professor’s solemn speeches to his students to explain to them the system of general and particular ideas of which the science they study consists (177).

He emphasizes that lessons are subject to “strict method” and “should feel as if the speaker is improvising his words but not improvising the ideas or the method”
(175-176). Enthusiasm and passion are included in this genre of eloquence, but with the nobility endowed by the search for truth in the consecrated setting of the university. He adds, too, a section entitled “On some other verbal works” corresponding overall to demonstrative speeches. In addition to the usual speeches, he adds speeches pronounced in “academies and societies of wise men” and in situations such as “prize giving ceremonies or openings of scientific associations.”

Gil de Zárate uses the division between prose and verse, rather than the division between oral and written works preferred by López. Gil de Zárate also refers to journalism in the context of political eloquence:

One of the branches of modern political eloquence, which is not unimportant, involves periodicals, in which background articles are in reality nothing other than harangues which a private party directs every day to a multitude of persons scattered throughout the area of a state. Periodicals have replaced ancient popular eloquence and inherited all its passion, vehemence and acrimony. [...] Nevertheless, in respected writers, in times and nations where political hate is not inflamed or bloody, journalism adopts the forms of good parliamentary discussion, though always more heated and vehement (199-200).

Although journalism is controlled by writing, it is still threatened by the passions present in certain forms of speech. Thus, Gil de Zárate prefers “good” parliamentary debate to harangues which aim to mobilize the masses.

The later books in the series, which are more sensitive to the new conditions, assign greater recognition to the diversity of genres associated to eloquence. By the mid-nineteenth century, they consider the readers of those texts: young members of the élite who will form the group of educated people that society needs to fulfill different tasks.

**Approaches to speaker training**

**Between the descriptive and the prescriptive**

The works we are looking at are pedagogical texts, which is why they are both descriptive and prescriptive. However, as we have seen, confidence in rules declines over the period considered, or at least, discussion of the scope and validity of rules is perceived as necessary. Hermosilla is a special case. His work is mainly prescriptive and includes many sections of numbered rules, although, being subject to the ideas of the times, he says: “without good preliminary studies, without the solid instruction they provide, and without the kind of talent required by the genre that each person chooses to exercise, rhetoric precepts are good for nothing” (315)

Even Munárriz, the earliest in the series, downplays the importance of rules:
Studying ancient critics and rhetoricians should not be dismissed, but neither should too much be expected from reading them, because their defect is that they are too systematic. Their writings suggest that they intended to train speakers through rules, as carpenters are trained. However, all that can be done at this point is to contribute to shaping a speaker’s taste and point out to their ingenuity the path that should be followed (265).

The authors we are studying are all influenced to some extent by Romantic sensitivity, and when they take a stance regarding the traditional opposition between ingenuity or talent and art, insist that eloquence is natural. Munárriz says, “Eloquence is not an invention of schools. Nature teaches all men to be eloquent; when they are passionate, and the art of oratory simply follows the paths that nature first marked in men” (182). Gil de Zárate says, “Eloquence, like poetry, is a gift of nature: we are born eloquent as we are born poets; and art alone cannot make us either poets or eloquent” (161). Similarly, López, also limiting the function and scope of rules, says:

Eloquence is a gift of organization rather than an effect of study, it is almost impossible to acquire; all that can be done is to nurture the germ where it exists, to develop it perfectly. In this regard, rules are good and excellent; because only by considering things thus can it be said that there is art for eloquence (157).

Despite downplaying the importance of rules to eloquence, these handbooks are texts for secondary school instruction, and therefore do include many rules which the different authors set out in different ways, as reflected by the descriptive/precriptive proportion.

In Munárriz, the description of types of eloquence is interspersed with recommendations, warnings and advice which are practical guidelines, rather than dogmatic: “In any argument, the speaker should put himself in the place of the listener. In order to persuade, the speaker should reflect on how the listener will be impressed by the proof he means to use” (239). Even when Munárriz provides numbered lists of rules, he includes grounds for the points he makes. For example, rules for introduction are accompanied by explanation and justification of the prescriptive statement, warnings against potential problems and advice on the best course to take:

3) The speaker must be modest. If he begins with an air of arrogance, he will offend the listener’s self-esteem and pride. Modesty should be shown through expressions, looks, gestures and tone of voice, but accompanied by certain dignity, which arises from knowledge of the fairness or importance of the issue. Sometimes, however, the speaker may use an elevated tone from the beginning […] But if he uses that tone, or makes a magnificent introduction, because the topic so requires, it should be sustained throughout the entire speech (232).

In this regard, he follows the source text (Blair), which he summarizes while
endeavoring to maintain the criterion regarding the set of rules.

Hermosilla tends to be more dogmatic, and does not situate, justify or discuss the rules. For example, when he refers to introduction, even though he does take up some of the aspects included by Munárriz, he states the rule without elaborating on its scope or possibilities of expression:

1) The orator should speak of himself modestly and show respect for his listeners and the things they appreciate and venerate.
2) The exordium should be simple, i.e. it should shun any pomp and affectation. However, this simplicity should not be mistaken for humbleness or timidity; rather, it is highly compatible with dignity and courage that is inspired by having justice on one’s side (292).

These succinct statements which do not include any grounds, create the impression of a rigid, ill-tempered author, and are rejected by López, as we have mentioned. With relation to the exordium, note also the following, where assertive emphasis is shown:

Begin with a general proposition; illustrate it in one, two or more clauses, according to how long an exordium is wanted. Then move on to another more specific or circumscribed proposition, which should be extended and proven like the first one. Finally, conclude with one that touches on the subject itself and serves as a transition to the general proposition of the speech (293).

When Hermosilla takes up Blair’s excerpts again explicitly, he notes that they are “indications of genre,” “advice” or “observations that can be considered to be more rules” (304). He therefore lists most of them as strict instructions. When he reformulates the “observations” from the source text, he makes them sound like rules and does not include any supporting reflections. Let us compare three versions of an excerpt about passions. The original excerpt is from the translation of Blair, the second one is the same idea summarized in Munárriz’s *Compendio*, and the third is a reformulation by Hermosilla. As the series progresses, it becomes more dogmatic and more distinctly prescriptive:

 […] there are clearly many subjects which in no way admit pathos; and even in those that do admit it, a speaker would risk appearing ridiculous if he sought to move passions in an inopportune place.
All that can be said in general is that if we expect to give birth to a passion that will have a long-lasting effect, we must first gain understanding in our favor. For listeners to be warmly interested in a cause, they have to be convinced that there are sufficient solid grounds to support it… (Blair, 125).

1) Consider carefully whether the matter admits pathos, and if so, where. This is the result of good sense; and in general it can only be said that to inspire lasting passion, understanding must first be gained (Munárriz, 243)

1) Not all subjects are suitable for moving feelings; some subjects are so unimportant or of such
nature that endeavoring to inflame listeners would only serve to make the speaker sound ridiculous. (Hermosilla, 304)

In Gil de Zárate, the rule stems from the description of the audience, the subject or the setting where the speech is pronounced. It is not set out as an emphatic numbered list, although it does provide pedagogical orientation:

Judges listen coldly to the speaker, and observe him severely, so he is forced to be more circumspect, sparing in his adornments, clear and precise in his argument, methodical in the distribution of evidence, dispassionate in attack and defense, temperate in tone, and simple in language: if he errs by making vehement declamations, in addition to making himself ridiculous, he will cause the severe tribunal to be ill-disposed towards him (183).

With regard to political oratory, he advises for example:

The parliamentary orator should also avoid another capital defect, which is monotony in style. As he often finds himself in the need to speak at length, this monotony becomes unbearable and puts his audience to sleep. In no genre of oratory is it as necessary as in this to vary the tone and move successively from the pathetic to the humble, from the ornate to the simple, from the serious to the festive (196).

López also includes prescription, description and justification:

Eloquence in the forum should always be grave, respectful and severe. It is true that the speaker raises his voice in the name of the law and morals, to which the supreme judges listening to him are subject; and it is also true that when the speaker claims an act of justice, he claims a right that nobody can deny, the fulfillment of a true duty. Nevertheless, his listeners are the tribunal that will judge the reality of that right, upon whose conscience and wisdom the victory of his word depends (172).

When López lists rules, they are general and move from the rhetorical to the social:

The art of the orator requires elocution and style. To achieve them, the orator 1) should be fully acquainted with the subject and all its relationships, be sagacious enough to follow them firmly, and sensible enough to vary the adornments; 2) should know how to use language skillfully, know all its resources, use all available means to make it clear, all laws of its musical character; 3), should always respect decency and social rules.

The handbooks we are analyzing usually downplay the importance of rules for the orator’s performance, influenced by the ideas of the times (except Hermosilla, who makes a show of his passion for rules). However, we cannot ignore the fact that a “handbook of rhetoric” is a genre that has to set out rules, and the books in the series balance descriptive/prescriptive contents in different ways.
Towards civic morality

The rules of rhetoric alone are not considered sufficient for the education of orators. The orator must be virtuous: persuasion requires “a character of recognized probity” (Gil de Zárate, 181). This reflects one of the purposes of schools: to influence people’s ideas by reiterating guiding principles of respectful behavior towards self and others. Chervil and Compère (1997:10) highlight the importance of Humanities in this kind of education, as shown in the selection of reading texts and the proposed writing exercises. Rhetoric lessons required students to compose speeches “defending and illustrating ‘virtues’ – we would say ‘values’ – including, among others: courage, moderation, prudence, abnegation, justice, honesty…”.

All these pedagogical texts stress the need for virtue in the orator, but this condition gradually became consolidated as a social need – shaping civic morality: “always respect decency and the laws of social culture” (López, 158). Quintilian speaks of the importance of moral virtues to public speaking and even states its influence on the speaker’s performance, while some of the treatises we are looking at stress appreciation for citizen values and the importance of democratic practices to the development of political eloquence mindful of the “common good.”

Munárriz, the earliest in the series, follows Quintilian and, like the other authors, claims that the capacity to persuade is related to the orator being upright and “good.” A preacher, he adds “should believe firmly in the truth and importance of those principles he wishes to instill in others” (270). Regarding any kind of oratory, he notes:

[…] if there is any suspicion of bad faith and duplicity in the orator, of his corruption or meanness, his speeches may amuse us, but they will be viewed as an artifice or mere entertainment, and will have no effect at all on us (259).

This is one of the answers which have been provided to the question about the relationship between rhetoric and morality. It is believed that if the orator is righteous he will be persuasive, but we know that righteousness is constructed discursively as an aspect of ethos (as are interest and passion, which some of our authors also consider to be persuasive gestures). Other authors believe that persuasive efficacy depends on the speaker personally believing in what he says (he who preaches the Gospel must believe in the Gospel), which lends the kind of strength to his words which cannot be achieved by the mere desire to manipulate. They prefer to illustrate morality with sacred eloquence, because political eloquence and forensic eloquence contain so many counter-examples of demagogues and successful defenses of criminals, in addition to which the Sophists, who would defend both a point and its opposite, come to mind. Thus, Gil de Zárate says:
If moral qualities are necessary in every orator, they are all the more essential in a preacher whose primary mission, which is to teach virtue, requires in him this same virtue to the highest degree, without which the precepts he provides would lack authority and would not be instilled into the hearts of his listeners. Moreover, religious and moral truths require devotion in the person who pronounces them, and this devotion is lacking when there is no conviction, when the orator does not speak from the heart, or when he does not firmly believe or practice what he advises (187).

Some of the treatises limit morality to conforming to the values admitted by the Doxa. However, discourse varies according to the needs of the cause and may reach conclusions which are contrary to some of those values. Other treatises, which also endeavor to separate morality from the individual and base it on the social, claim that the right thing is for discourse to respond to the common good. Although this is a broad concept, subject to different interpretations, as national States became consolidated, the point was resolved as the good of the Fatherland, including its institutions (often democratic and republican). Morality thus became civic morality based on “the opinion of a large number of individuals” (López, 156).

In the most recent text (López), morality is clearly associated with politics, and, thus, with collective aspirations. When López defines the matters that will enable him to establish types of eloquence, he says:

That moral being which we call Fatherland, which is the center of all general interests, is composed of four social factors: God, the Association, the law, and Teaching or gradual progress of everyone towards possible perfection. Thus, all matters which can be spoken of in public, and are therefore solemn, can be reduced to: Holy matters, Political and military matters; Forensic matters, Doctrinal matters (149).

Individual morality (“guarantees of morality and virtue must be provided” [156]) is completed by numerous references to civic morality:

The fatherland has given us strength by fortifying our natural talents with the liberal benefits of an education costing enormous sums of money every year. Using this strength to damage the fatherland, forgetting its wider interests in favor of our own shameful well-being, constitutes infamous ingratitude, which we should view with horror from the earliest age (156).

The individual and the social are interwoven: “an immoral man will never become the favorite of public opinion or the representative of great and serious interests of his fatherland” (López, 157).

Thus, by the end of the series, the link between rhetoric and morality is based essentially on civic values. This shows the progressive consolidation of national States and the need to strengthen representative institutions in consensuses going beyond individual mandates.
Knowledge which the person aspiring to master eloquence must possess or acquire

The authors also suggest that rhetorical knowledge alone is insufficient:

Nowadays, verbosity and fluency alone are insufficient; it does not suffice to put forth images, epithets, rhetoric adornments; all these are like vain foliage; and solid instruction, precise reasoning and good judgment are preferred in orators (Gil de Zárate, 192).

In the same vein, Vicente Fidel López concludes his Introduction to Curso de Bellas Letras (Course in Belles-Lettres) by saying:

Thus, I write about rhetoric; but I would hesitate to say that my subject is one of the most important for a young man to study at the end of the first half of the nineteenth century.

This reflects the tension between writing a handbook of rhetoric as required by the syllabuses (for secondary schools in Chile directed by the renovated Instituto Nacional [National Institute]) and the belief that Humanities, in their broad sense, and the wide range of scientific knowledge of the time, are both essential to education.

There are different approaches in the texts we are looking at, but they all consider progress in the fields of culture and science. Munárriz, for example, recommends “instruction in all liberal arts and the study of philosophy and politics” (260). To this he adds the practice of “habitual and continuous application to study” and “continuous exercise in both composing and speaking” (262).

Hermosilla admits that “without good preliminary studies, without the solid instruction that they provide, and without the kind of talent required by the genre that each man chooses to exercise, rhetoric precepts are good for nothing.” Thus, in relation to forensic oratory, he says, “the important thing is that the orator should have studied in great depth the laws of his country” (307). And regarding politics, he recommends “a profound study of laws, political economy, statistics, the system of public finance and administration, diplomacy, and in Catholic countries canonic law and the discipline of the Church” (312).

Gil de Zárate says that the orator always needs solid education beyond the framework of rhetoric. With regard to forensic oratory, he says:

He who aspires to shine at parliaments must prepare himself to perform such a difficult task by conducting a profound study of laws, political economy, statistics, administrative science, diplomacy, theory of governments and everything related to ecclesiastical subjects (192).

López increases the number of subjects on which knowledge is needed, saying:
The public speaker’s need to study the secrets of the human heart, the character of passions, the national character of the people, their dominant ideas and their most pronounced inclinations… (155)

With regard to political eloquence he highlights, according to the style of the times (Caballero, 2008), the importance of history:

[...] history –past and contemporary, national and foreign– should be the object of incessant study, the eternal background of meditations of any young man aspiring to shine in the brilliant and highly useful role of public speaker. By history we do not mean only the history of battles, which is undoubtedly the least interesting; we mean history that shows the causes and effects of social events; we mean general history which explains the birth and development of all social sciences, legislation, political economy, statistics, international law, and so many other subjects which, because they are closely related to well-being and progress of nations, must necessarily be dealt with by the action and influence of the modern orator (168-169).

By stressing that mere rhetorical knowledge is not enough to make a good orator, and that knowledge of a range of disciplines is needed, these handbooks open the way towards the elimination of rhetoric as a subject, making room for other subjects, which would presumably provide solid grounds for written and oral production without the need for discursive regulation.

Final observations

Rhetoric has roots in Greco-Roman Antiquity. It forms a broad discursive tradition involving evocations, resumptions, distances, breaks, and transformations. Particularly in the domain of pedagogy, rhetoric also includes other fields such as the art of preaching, *ars dictaminis*, and poetics, in different ways, with different scopes and according to the varying circumstances. These fields focus on specific aims but may be used as reflections on discursiveness by the field of rhetoric.

Studying rhetoric calls for analyzing features which have been constant over time, but also what cannot be said or is not being said, and new features whose introduction is deemed necessary. Comparing texts in a representative series is an important tool for studying these phenomena. Explaining them calls for enquiring into their context. Although the biographical data of the authors and the information on the conditions under which each text was produced (schools, orders from ministries, primary target readers) are often illuminating, we cannot leave aside broader historical processes which may be common to different countries, as in the case we analyze herein.

In the early nineteenth century, following recent democratic revolutions, the mechanism of political representation had changed and broader sectors of society needed to be involved in the state apparatus. In addition, the written word was
becoming increasingly influential in shaping popular ideas. All this led to the creation of new schools in order to increase the number of educated people who would be able to speak in public and shape the opinions of their fellow citizens. In accordance with ongoing changes, these people were to defend individual and collective interests by using strategies different from those of more turbulent times, now grounded in the rule of law. Public speaking and emotions needed to be kept under control to prevent any further unmanageable revolutionary uprisings. Representative forms of political participation requiring reflection on speeches were preferred, in an effort to ensure stable forms of coexistence. This in turn led to a rise in political writing genres such as essays and journalism.

In this setting, which involved the creation or renovation of secondary schools, teaching rhetoric was considered. Eloquence (forensic, political, sacred) was preserved as a core, and to it were added the study of historical and other genres not previously considered, such as the lesson, bureaucratic genres or genres related to associations of various kinds. It also included new genres that were typical of society at the time, such as journalistic, scientific and disclosure genres. The presence of literary genres increased at the same time, eventually taking the foreground.

We also identified changes related to eloquence. Speaking transitioned from indications about actio to the dominant subject of improvisation. In turn, improvisation transitioned from being well prepared to letting the orator’s ideas flow as he spoke. Models shifted from Latin to European languages and national expressions. With regard to rules, more emphasis was placed on the characterization of phenomena and on providing grounds for rules, which led to including prescription within description and leaving aside instructional formats. With regard to moral aspects, civic virtues were emphasized. And regarding the education of the orator, the need arose to include knowledge from a range of current fields beyond rhetorical principles.

All these developments show the importance of training in rhetoric during those decades, whilst at the same time foreshadowing that it was soon to become outdated. A short time later, the study of discourse began to focus on literary texts and a more restrictive version of the field. Training in public genres, which the ruling class had needed to learn at school during the early stages, gave way to exercises with school genres. Eloquence, which had been taught for many years in response to social needs, would be dropped from secondary school subjects in the late nineteenth century.
Sources

Blair, Hugh (1816 [1783]), *Lecciones sobre la Retórica y las Bellas Letras*, 4 tomos, 3ª edición de la traducción realizada por José Luis Munárriz, Madrid: Ibarra

Carlos III, rey. [1768] Real cédula de S.M. a consulta de los señores del Consejo reduciendo el arancel de los derechos procesales de los reales de vellón en toda la Corona de Aragón. Disponible en: https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=mbelipZiLggC&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&authuser=0&hl=pt_BR&pg=GBS.PR7


Hermosilla, José Gómez (1841 [1826]), *Arte de hablar en prosa y verso*, novena edición, París: Librería de Garnier Hermanos.

López, Vicente Fidel (1845), *Curso de Bellas Letras*, Santiago, Imprenta del Siglo.

Munárriz, José Luis (1815), *Compendio de las lecciones sobre la Retórica y Bellas letras de Hugo Blair*, Madrid: Imprenta de Ibarra.

References


Fumaroli, Marc (1980), L’Age de l’éloquence, París: Albin Michel.


González Alcázar, Felipe (2006), Procesos de la poética clasicista: los tratados de preceptiva españoles del siglo XIX, Murcia: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Murcia.


Murphy, James J. (1986), La retórica en la Edad Media, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica.


Pedrezuela Fuentes, Mario (2011), “La enseñanza de la lengua y la literatura en los institutos del siglo XIX. De la formación de retóricos y latinos a educar la imaginación” en Boletín de la Real Academia Española, tomo 91, cuaderno 304, pp. 325-351.


Régent-Susini, Anne (2009), L’éloquence de la chaire, París: Seuil.
